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In Buying a Bride, Marcia Zug explores the history and law of 
“mail-order brides,” which has been a feature of the American 
experience since its inception. This little-understood phenomenon is 
often conflated with, and reviled as, human trafficking. Zug is, however, 
a staunch defender. Although clear-eyed about its exploitative potential, 
she argues that it has often been a means for women to increase their 
financial, social, and legal autonomy. 
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Feminist legal scholars will find this book important because Zug 
shows how mail-order marriage led directly to the adoption of laws 
giving women independent economic rights and the western states 
granting female suffrage before the East followed suit. It is also 
significant for critical race scholars because Zug chronicles the crucial 
way that anxieties about race, ethnic purity, and immigration affected 
the dominant attitude towards the practice from the colonial era until 
today. 
Zug’s title intentionally reflects the offensive terminology of critics. 
“[R]ather than shying away from the association with female 
commodification, I decided to confront it . . . . By referring to the 
women in this book as ‘mail-order brides,’ I signal my intention to 
address these criticisms and explicitly challenge the assumption that 
such women are exploited.”1 
She discusses several institutions that seem facially quite diverse. 
What she believes they have in common is that they all involve “a 
marriage resulting from some form of advertisement or other public 
request, soliciting women to enter into a marriage with a previously 
unknown man and typically travel a significant distance to complete this 
union.”2 
Zug has a number of responses to those who condemn mail-order 
marriages. First, they conflate different things. Yes, historically, some 
European women were kidnapped and forcibly transported to American 
colonies, and yes, today, human trafficking is a real crime sometimes 
fostered by fraudulent advertisements over the Internet. However, Zug 
argues that these are distinct from the practices she discusses. 
Second, those who argue that mail-order marriages encourage the 
commodification of women expressly or implicitly assume an idealized 
norm of marriage as a romantic union between equals having the goal of 
personal self-fulfillment. Zug, in contrast, emphasizes that marriage has 
traditionally been, first and foremost, an economic relationship with the 
interconnected goals of establishing a household and carrying on the 
family line. Although we moderns may try to repress this inconvenient 
fact, our foremothers and many of our contemporary foreign sisters, 
could not and cannot afford to be so squeamish. 
Third and most importantly, critics view mail-order marriages 
from an ahistorical and culturally myopic perspective. Traditionally, 
women had relatively little choice in their career and marriage 
prospects—partners being imposed by family, custom, and lack of 
alternatives. Women, both in the past and in many countries now, enter 
into mail-order marriages in large part to escape these strictures. That is, 
 
 1 MARCIA A. ZUG, BUYING A BRIDE: AN ENGAGING HISTORY OF MAIL-ORDER MATCHES 7 
(2016). 
 2 Id. at 7–8. 
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mail-order marriage can increase feminine agency. 
I would go further. It is not so much that mail-order marriages 
commodify women. Rather, history, anthropology, and psychoanalytical 
theory suggest that woman is the ur-commodity. Historically, societies 
structure themselves, and the masculine subject creates himself, through 
the possession and exchange of women by men (albeit, often aided and 
abetted by women who accept the status quo). Through mail-order 
marriages, individual women seek to interfere with this dynamic by 
becoming active participants in the bargaining process. Tellingly, 
according to Zug, American public opinion only turned against mail-
order marriage in the late nineteenth century when the development of 
mass-circulation publication and personal ads enabled women to not 
merely accept solicitations but to actively solicit partners themselves. 
This was the tipping point of too much female agency. 
Neither Zug, nor I, should be misunderstood as ignoring the 
problems of mail-order marriage let alone arguing that it is superior to 
other historical or contemporary ways of finding spouses and 
establishing households. For myself, I am in a companionable love-
based marriage consistent with the modern romantic ideal and would 
not have considered a mail-order marriage when I was single. But this is 
because we both are highly educated white women, reared in middle-
class families in late twentieth-century America, who had other 
economic opportunities than marriage. Zug reminds us that women like 
us are the empirical exceptions to the predominant rule. 
Consequently, Zug admirably does not deny but confronts the 
traditional subordination of women. What she does do is interfere with 
a common (but far from universal) feminist narrative of woman as 
passive victim. 
I.     COLONIAL HISTORY 
Zug starts with the British settlement of Jamestown in the early 
seventeenth century. Unlike the religiously inspired northern colonists 
who arrived in family groups, the southern colonies tended to attract 
single males, many of whom expected to stay for a short time and return 
home.3 Consequently, the government sought to import British women 
to encourage more permanent settlements. 
Here, Zug upbraids Marilyn French for claiming that colonial 
Virginia was populated through the kidnapping, terrorism, and rape of 
English women.4 Zug acknowledges that early attempts to pay recruiters 
to find settlers led to abductions—of both men and women. Zug argues 
 
 3 Id. at 12. 
 4 Id. at 29. 
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that this was quickly discontinued as a failed experiment to be replaced 
by other recruitment techniques. Consequently, “French’s inaccurate 
description confuses instances in which Englishwomen were kidnapped 
with the willing immigration of the Jamestown brides” and “refuses to 
acknowledge the possibility that the women came willingly or that 
becoming a mail-order bride could be a rational or even wise decision.”5 
The Virginia Company offered financial incentives to women to 
move to Virginia. “Tobacco wives” were offered passage, clothing, food, 
supply, and shelter.6 But, more importantly for Zug’s story, the women 
who immigrated were given economic opportunities that were not 
available in Great Britain. They were granted greater property and 
inheritance rights than they would have in England where a femme 
couvert lost control of her property and right to contract upon marriage. 
In some cases female colonists were granted land by the state and were 
paid comparable wages to men.7 Most female colonists were from 
“modest backgrounds” who would most likely have had to go into 
service at home and postpone marriage for many years while they 
worked to earn funds to support a household.8 In other words, these 
women, like male colonists, were making rational decisions given their 
economic and legal opportunities. Were the opportunities available in 
Virginia great? Probably no. Were they better than those available in 
Britain? Probably yes. 
Although Zug describes this as the first example of mail-order 
wives, significantly, women who accepted the offer to immigrate were 
not required to marry at all, let alone marry any specific man. That is, 
they received the financial incentives regardless of their eventual marital 
status. Just having a (white) feminine presence in Virginia was 
considered positive. And, indeed, some female immigrants chose not to 
marry. If a woman did wish to marry, she had considerable choice of 
partners, as men continued to substantially outnumber women. Zug’s 
analysis of the case law for breach of promise—the cause of action 
“when one party breaks off an engagement and the jilted party believes 
that he or she has been unfairly treated and harmed by the loss of the 
intended marriage”9—is telling. In England they were almost always 
brought by women against men. “[I]n the Virginia colony, this situation 
was reversed.”10 
Zug illustrates her point by contrasting the two radically different 
experiences France had in introducing Frenchwomen to its two western 
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colonies—New France (i.e., Canada) and Louisiana. In Canada, in order 
to counter the sexual imbalance of colonists, the government created the 
institution of les filles du roi (“the king’s daughters”). Frenchwomen 
were offered financial incentives, including substantial dowries. 
Although initially targeted to rural women who presumably would be 
more willing to face the hardships of colonial life, surprisingly, 
applicants came from cities as well as villages, and from all classes, 
including the nobility.11 As an indication of the bargaining power these 
women had, although under French law a wife would ordinarily lose 
control of her dowry (in this case supplied by the State) upon marriage, 
in Canada “more than 82 percent of the women signed marital contracts 
ensuring they retained at least some of their separate property after 
marriage.”12 
The king’s daughters came to Canada, not because they were 
looking for love, but for practical economic reasons. “Nevertheless, 
because the filles du roi had the opportunity to get to know their 
potential husbands [i.e., as opposed to at home in France where families 
typically arranged marriages], they actually had a greater chance of 
marrying for love than did most seventeenth-century Frenchwomen.”13 
The success of the king’s daughters must be contrasted to the 
woeful French experience in Louisiana. An early program similar to the 
king’s daughters proved unsuccessful because recruiters blatantly lied 
about the conditions of the Southern colonies.14 Reportedly, the women 
were also treated abysmally, often raped in transit, and as a result, 
refused to marry and ended up “living in misery.”15 Word of the truth 
leaked back to France, dooming the effort. 
France responded in the worst possible way—transporting female 
prisoners to Louisiana.16 In Zug’s words: 
The compulsory immigration of Frenchwomen was unconscionable, 
but what happened to many of the women before they departed for 
Louisiana is equally horrific. Some were forcibly married to male 
prisoners bound for the colony, while others were chained and 
marched across France as a warning to other potential criminals. 
Hundreds died on these treks. In 1719, 150 female prisoners rioted to 
avoid the march and forced immigration to Louisiana. Six of them 
were shot, a dozen more were wounded, and the rest spent the winter 
starving, ill clothed, and housed in freezing conditions. In the spring, 
the survivors were shipped to the colony. In total, approximately 
7,000 women were deported to the colony, but most never made it. 
 
 11 Id. at 37–38. 
 12 Id. at 39. 
 13 Id. at 41. 
 14 Id. at 52. 
 15 Id. at 54. 
 16 Id. at 55. 
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The majority died on the forced marches and perilous sea voyage. 
Only 1,300 actually arrived in the colony, of whom only 178 
remained alive in 1721.17 
This gynocide overtakes even the horrors that Marilyn French invokes. 
Nevertheless, Zug argues that we must distinguish the Louisiana 
experience of exploitation and kidnapping of female prisoners from 
voluntary mail-order marriage in New France and America.18 
II.     THE WESTERN EXPANSION 
Zug tells a parallel story about the settlement of the American West 
in the nineteenth century. The California gold rush of 1849 led to a 
highly skewed sex ratio (even after including indigenous women). There 
were numerous recruitment movements to persuade women to relocate 
from eastern cities and mill towns that suffered from a deficit of both 
eligible single men and jobs. The successful ones emphasized 
employment opportunities, subsidized transportation costs, and 
promised greater social equality. 
Most interestingly from a legal perspective, in order to encourage 
female migration, western states adopted progressive legislation giving 
married women “control over their separate property”19 and liberalizing 
divorce law.20 The federal government adopted the Donation Land Act 
covering the Oregon Territory that not only allowed married couples to 
“claim twice the land available to single men,”21 but also “dispensed with 
the normal rules of coverture and guaranteed that half the claimed land 
would become the separate estate of the wife.”22 The Homestead Act 
went further, allowing single women to claim land in their own right 
(although few other than engaged women and families with unmarried 
daughters were in a position to do so).23 A generation later, western 
states, starting with Wyoming in 1869, granted female suffrage as a way 
of encouraging female immigration. “By 1915, women had suffrage in 
every western state save Texas and New Mexico. In contrast, not a single 
eastern state had granted the right to women.”24 
Once again, although Zug refers to this as “mail-order marriage,” 
 
 17 Id. at 57 (footnotes omitted). Opera lovers will remember the last scene of Puccini’s 
Manon Lescaut in which the titular anti-heroine, transported with other courtesans to 
Louisiana, expires in the desert outside of New Orleans. 
 18 Id. at 61. 
 19 Id. at 80. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 85. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 86. 
 24 Id. at 141. 
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and the potential for marriage was advertised as one attraction for 
female immigrants, women were not required to marry. In fact, women 
who moved west generally did not marry quickly and sometimes not at 
all because of the availability of other economic alternatives. As Zug 
states concerning the “Mercer girls” who settled in the Oregon 
Territory, they “left their homes and families and traveled thousands of 
miles in order to gain greater command and independence over their 
economic, social, and political destinies.”25 Zug emphasizes that they did 
not find—or expect—perfection. But, like all entrepreneurs (and male 
settlers), they took a calculated risk in an attempt to improve their 
position. 
III.     CHANGING TIMES 
The public attitude towards mail-order marriages changed when 
the custom evolved from generalized solicitation of women to address 
sex-ratio imbalances, to individualized solicitation. 
Once western states achieved their demographic objectives they had 
little interest in continuing to promote mail-order marriage and 
quickly stopped extolling its benefits and began emphasizing its 
dangers. Meanwhile, eastern support for mail-order marriages had 
always been tenuous, and without the West’s population concerns, 
these states saw little reason to promote mail-order marriages.26 
In the meantime, other social changes were occurring. During the 
Civil War, women were encouraged to correspond with soldiers, 
including those they did not know, as a patriotic duty.27 This was 
abetted by new “modern” media, i.e., newspapers and personal ads. 
Individual soldiers took out ads looking for pen pals, often holding out 
the possibility of marriage after the war.28 
The war’s carnage created a demographic imbalance in the eastern 
United States, the opposite of that which had led to the earlier mail-
order marriage, i.e., a surfeit of single women. Moreover, once the 
genies of correspondence between unrelated women and men, and 
personal ads were out of the bottle, they could not be put back in. 
Nevertheless, marital advertisement outside of the military context, 
although common, was never completely socially acceptable because it 
enabled women to take control of their own courtship away from their 
families. Consequently, although the press was happy to collect the 
revenues from the ads, it tended to run articles emphasizing the dangers 
 
 25 Id. at 93. 
 26 Id. at 133. 
 27 Id. at 134. 
 28 Id. at 135. 
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of fraudulent marriage offers.29 
This new practice led to a number of pro-female legal changes. The 
tort of seduction was expanded so that the woman, and not her father, 
could be a plaintiff.30 The remedies for breach of promise were 
expanded to include punitive and exemplary damages.31 Common law 
marriages were now recognized and protected in most states.32 
IV.     RACE AND XENOPHOBIA 
Zug’s story is an American one and, as such, it is as much about 
race as sex. Her relatively sunny account of mail-order marriage is 
overshadowed by the fact that it was often driven by racial and ethnic 
hatred. 
White male settlers in both Jamestown and New France initially 
married indigenous women. Indeed, the French encouraged this on the 
theory that it would lead to the assimilation of Indians to European 
ways.33 But the opposite was the case. 
Pocahontas, who converted to Christianity and moved to England 
with her husband John Rolfe, was the exception. The norm was that 
white men who married Indians tended to abandon the colonies and 
join their wives’ people.34 This was not only religiously offensive to the 
colonial authorities, it threatened to undermine the success of the 
enterprise and lead to the “adulteration” of the “whiteness and purity of 
the children.”35 In addition, once the French and the English began 
allying with different Indian ethnic groups, intermarriage could be a 
security risk.36 Consequently, the attempts to recruit European women 
to the “New World” was to a large part driven by the fear that 
intermarriage was leading to what the French called the 
“ensauvagement” of the Europeans.37 
Zug’s account of the western movement of Caucasian women in 
 
 29 Id. at 127–28, 147–49. 
 30 Id. at 151–52. 
 31 Id. at 152. 
 32 Id. at 152–53. 
 33 Indian women were often eager to marry Europeans, especially in Canada. There was a 
sexual imbalance resulting in a paucity of native grooms. But more importantly, Indian wives 
could serve as translators and cultural liaisons “enabl[ing] them to boost their prestige and 
authority within the tribe.” Id. at 32. 
 34 As David Brooks notes, even in the eighteenth century, “[a]s time went by, the settlers 
from Europe noticed something: No Indians were defecting to join colonial society, but many 
whites were defecting to live in the Native American one.” David Brooks, The Great Affluence 
Fallacy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/opinion/the-great-
affluence-fallacy.html?_r=0. 
 35 ZUG, supra note 1, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36 Id. at 32–33. 
 37 Id. at 31. 
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the nineteenth century reveals a similar racial animosity. Initially, some 
white male settlers cohabited with Indian women (although this practice 
was not encouraged as it was in the early colonies).38 When the 
significant numbers of white women did immigrate, however, courts 
started refusing to recognize these common law marriages, disinheriting 
Indian women and mixed-race children. “[T]he Oregon territorial 
government passed a law voiding solemnized marriages between whites 
and all other racial groups . . . .”39 
Nevertheless, mail-order marriage did allow African American 
women as well as Caucasians to improve their economic and legal 
status, allowing them “to escape the South and its crushing racial 
restrictions” by moving west.40 For example, the “Busy Bee Club, a 
group, founded in 1885 by six African American women, seeking to 
increase female immigration . . . . placed matrimonial advertisements in 
numerous eastern papers and then supplied interested women with one-
way tickets paid for by [Tucson’s] bachelors.”41 
If racism encouraged official support for mail-order marriage in 
early American history, it was also a factor in the increasingly negative 
view among the white majority population starting in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Alarm over the influx of laborers led first to the 
de facto prohibition of Chinese women as presumptive prostitutes and 
then the outright ban of all Chinese immigration under the Chinese 
Exclusion Act.42 Although initially other Asians could enter the United 
States, after the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1905, the only Japanese who 
were eligible to enter the country were the wives and children of 
Japanese men who were already here. As anti-miscegenation laws 
prohibited them from marrying non-Asian women, Asian American 
men sought to bring Asian women into the country.43 This led to the 
practice of “picture brides,” i.e., the solicitation of potential wives from 
Japan, Okinawa, and Korea through photos and letters.44 
Unlike the white “mail-order brides” in Virginia, New France, and 
the American West, these women had no choice but to marry specific 
men. Picture brides could not immigrate unless they were already 
married to their suitors. Consequently, they married men they never 
met by proxy. If a picture bride changed her mind upon meeting her 
husband, she risked being deported back home to the very situation she 
 
 38 In addition, sexual violence by white settlers against the native population was rife. Id. at 
66–68. 
 39 Id. at 86. 
 40 Id. at 141. 
 41 Id. at 142. 
 42 Id. at 158. 
 43 Id. at 159–60. 
 44 Id. at 160–64. 
1438 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 39:1429 
was desperate to escape.45 
As the accounts of many picture brides indicate, then as now with 
dating websites, prospective grooms often engaged in fraudulent 
inducements, sending old photographs and exaggerating or lying about 
their professions and wealth.46 Nevertheless, Zug defends the practice as 
autonomy-enhancing, given the alternatives. Most of these women were 
making conscious, if perhaps poorly informed, decisions to leave 
grinding poverty, toil, and the prospect of arranged marriages. Despite 
their often unhappy marriages, many women made the most of the 
greater economic opportunities and political freedom available in the 
United States, becoming successful businesswomen and community 
leaders. Their financial success enabled them—once they were 
established as permanent residents—to divorce at rates higher than 
native-born American women.47 
Japanese immigration was ended in 1924, but hostility towards 
mail-order marriage was driven by more generalized xenophobia. 
Immigration from Europe became more restricted, and it became 
increasingly hard for even highly skilled single women to convince the 
immigration authorities that they were not either prostitutes or 
undesirables “likely to become a public charge” or “LPC.”48 However, 
the Quota Act, which severely restricted immigration from eastern and 
southern Europe, did not apply to wives. Like Asian women before 
them, European woman turned to mail-order marriages as a means of 
achieving their goal of immigration.49 
Unfortunately, early feminism was another source of anti-
immigration attitudes, generally, and mail-order marriages, specifically. 
Women’s rights advocates worried that foreign-born women were more 
traditional than Americans and would not support progressive pro-
female legislation.50 Early feminists also argued that mail-order 
marriages were “death sentences to individuality and progress” because 
these women “submissively accept[ed] unknown husbands without 
friendship, romance, love, or any of those backgrounds which we have 
grown to regard as essential to marriage.”51 Zug thinks that this, once 
again, ignores that these women were asserting their agency in choosing 
economic and marital prospects that they believed were superior to 
those available at home. 
 
 45 Id. at 164–65. 
 46 Id. at 165–66. 
 47 Id. at 166–68. 
 48 Id. at 171. 
 49 Id. at 174–80. 
 50 In contrast, native-born American women lost their citizenship and suffrage (in those 
states where women could vote) if they married a non-citizen. Id. at 181–82. 
 51 Id. at 183 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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V.     MODERN TIMES 
The most controversial section of Zug’s book concerns her analysis 
of contemporary practices. Mail-order marriage “virtually disappeared 
in the 1950’s”52 as “the idea of marriage as an equal partnership” became 
the norm.53 Nevertheless, it has recently made a comeback. “There are 
currently more than four hundred international marriage broker 
agencies,” most of which employ websites that women can use for free, 
but men are charged “substantial fees.”54 
The standard view of these websites is negative. Some feminists 
consider mail-order marriages to be a form of trafficking by definition.55 
Others argue that the women who enter into these are subject to 
domestic abuse.56 The popular press presents the common stereotype 
that men who seek them are losers who reject modern marriage of 
equals and seek to control docile, traditional women.57 
One final objection to mail-order marriage is the belief that it 
commodifies something that should not be commodified and therefore 
exploits women. As marriage historian Nancy Cott has written, 
“American rhetoric and popular culture . . . put love and money on 
opposite sides of the street. Mercenary or cold-blooded motives for 
marrying [are] labeled crass, unethical, and destined for disastrous 
fate.”58 
Zug argues that things are much more complicated. First, she 
disposes of the trafficking accusation by arguing that this expansive 
definition lumps “legitimate” websites with abusive ones. She also 
argues that those who argue that mail-order brides are often abused 
make questionable use of statistics. The best argument is that there is 
some evidence that immigrant women are abused at a higher rate than 
native-born Americans. However, there is no evidence that mail-order 
brides are disproportionately abused when compared to other 
immigrants. Indeed, there is some evidence to the contrary.59 Zug 
suggests that since, by definition, mail-order brides have immigrated 
lawfully, they have more opportunity to leave their husbands, report 
abuse, and seek legal protection than undocumented immigrants who 
might feel trapped in an abusive relationship.60 
Second, she argues that the ideal that romantic love should be a 
 
 52 Id. at 188. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 189. 
 55 Id. at 198–99. 
 56 Id. at 191–93. 
 57 Id. at 190–91. 
 58 Id. at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59 Id. at 194–95. 
 60 Id. at 193–96. 
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necessary consideration in choosing marriage partners is extremely 
recent. “[I]t was not until the late twentieth century that a majority of 
American women finally indicated that love outweighed all other 
considerations in choosing a partner.”61 And the American obsession 
with romance in marriage may partially account for the high divorce 
rate in contemporary times. 
Third, Zug discusses studies that suggest that neither the American 
men nor the foreign women in these relations easily conform to the 
stereotype of domineering misogynist chauvinists and passive women. 
Although the men surveyed do tend to say that they are seeking more 
“traditional” women who will accept “the male protector/provider 
role,”62 they also accept the fact that their wives will want to work 
outside the house. These men tend to feel “disempowered in relation to 
elites” and “[c]onsequently, for many of these struggling men, the 
appeal of a mail-order marriage is not that it introduces them to women 
they can dominate, but that it connects them with sympathetic partners 
who have experienced similar struggles.”63 In addition, because 
American women still tend to either marry economic equals or marry 
up despite their increased economic and educational achievements, 
there is a shortage of single women willing to marry men without 
college education, particularly in the African American community.64 In 
contrast, highly educated women in some countries believe that they are 
disadvantaged in the local marriage market because of traditional 
values. Marriage broker websites can, therefore, address these 
demographic mismatches. 
Most radically, Zug invokes the work of Professor Robin West who 
argues that it is the romantic concept of marriage that “encourages 
women to provide their services for free and devalues women and the 
work they do . . . .”65 In West’s analysis, women are encouraged to think 
of the good of others and not their own maximization and thereby lose 
“the sense of integrity necessary to at least liberal conceptions of 
individualism.”66 Zug suggests that, based on this analysis, a mail-order 
bride may be better off than a woman marrying in the hope of being 
loved. “A mail-order bride who makes her sacrifices and performs 
caregiving for her husband and family as part of a contractual 
understanding is empowered by her actions in a way the ‘loving’ 
altruistic wife is not.”67 
Finally, to tie this last chapter to her earlier ones, Zug implicitly 
 
 61 Id. at 216. 
 62 Id. at 212. 
 63 Id. at 200–04, 211. 
 64 Id. at 174–80. 
 65 Id. at 217. 
 66 ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 121 (1999). 
 67 ZUG, supra note 1, at 218. 
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accuses critics of modern mail-order marriages of cultural blindness. 
Mail-order marriages may not look like a partnership of equals to 
American academics. However, the brides surveyed believe that their 
grooms’ attitudes are more egalitarian than those of their countrymen. 
In other words, Zug is arguing, once again, that these women are 
making a rational choice to expand their agency based on the 
opportunities they believe are otherwise available to them.68 
To drive home this point, in her conclusion, Zug introduces us 
briefly to one of the unexpected consequences of marriage equality—the 
development of all-male mail-order marriage websites. Regrettably, 
there are many countries where homosexuality is illegal or, at least, 
dangerous. Consequently, some gay foreign men—like women before 
them—see marriage to a stranger not as a romantic panacea, but as a 
practical alternative. 
VI.     POST-MODERNISM 
This is not a theoretical book, but it raises theoretical questions. 
Zug is well aware that her relatively positive account of mail-order 
marriage may be offensive to some American feminists concerned about 
the commodification of women. But Zug critiques this position as 
implicitly assuming that women start from the position of freedom and 
are then subordinated. 
This assumption is problematic for two reasons. First, as Zug 
argues, it is incorrect as a historical and anthropological fact. Second, as 
I shall argue, it implicitly adopts the classical liberal proposition that the 
subject begins as the free individual within the state of nature who is 
then oppressed by society. 
Zug’s analysis arguably fits better into Continental or speculative 
political theory than within the classical liberal paradigm that dominates 
American thinking. Liberalism takes individuation and freedom as 
givens. This means that society is a constraint and, therefore, a problem 
to be explained and justified. Speculative theory, in contrast, seeks to 
understand how individuation and freedom can be created within and 
through society. Liberalism’s hypothetical state of nature is not, in fact, 
natural let alone empirical. It is a logical construct or thought 
experiment. Freedom can only become concrete and positive within 
society. 
Of course, the speculative position is not the silly one that all 
societies are free. As I shall discuss, historically, most human beings 
have been constrained by society. From a Hegelian perspective, Western 
society only developed to a stage where freedom was beginning to 
 
 68 Id. at 221–23. 
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become actualized in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
when modern property and contract relations and constitutional 
representative government were replacing feudalism. Moreover, from 
the position of structuralist anthropology and Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
women are the primal commodity. 
The question from the speculative feminist position is, therefore, 
not how does society commodify women. It is how do women create a 
society in which we can decommodifiy ourselves. Zug argues that, 
ironically, mail-order marriages enable women to achieve some degree 
of agency, individuation, and practical freedom by taking an active role 
in controlling their pre-existing commodification. 
VII.     HISTORY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 
Zug emphasizes that the decisions women make in accepting mail-
order marriage invitations must be examined in the context of the 
alternatives available in their time and culture. A related point is made 
by legal historian Mark Weiner in a somewhat different context. 
In The Rule of the Clan,69 Weiner defends the modern liberal state 
from attacks from libertarianism, which assumes that freedom and 
rights pre-exist law. He argues that the State does not merely protect the 
liberal70 ideals of individual rights and equality, it creates them. 
Weiner rejects one of liberalism’s founding presuppositions: the 
free individual in the state of nature as a historic fact. Wiener’s 
examination of traditional societies across history show that they share a 
single broad organizational structure that belies their facial diversity. He 
defines the “clan” as “legal structures and cultural values of societies 
organized primarily on the basis of kinship . . . .”71 “[C]ompared with 
modern liberal states, communities governed by the rule of the clan 
possess a markedly diminished conception of individual 
freedom . . . . because under their legal principles people are valued less 
as individuals per se than as members of their extended families.”72 
“Natural” man is not free. Moreover, history shows that when 
states fail, society quickly devolves back into clan-like organization.73 If 
we were to fail to “maintain and nurture robust state institutions 
 
 69 MARK WEINER, THE RULE OF THE CLAN: WHAT AN ANCIENT FORM OF SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION REVEALS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (2013). 
 70 He uses the term “liberal” to “refer to people committed to the values of individualism 
and the principles of liberal democratic government, regardless of party affiliation.” Id. at 8. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 9.  
 73 In his words, “[t]he clan is a natural form of social and legal organization—it is far more 
explicable in human terms than the modern liberal state—and people quickly, reflexively turn 
to it in the want of an alternative.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
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dedicated to the public interest, ignoring our human impulse to create 
clanlike forms of legal organization, it [would] spell the end of 
individualism as we know it.”74 
Similarly, the great liberal principle embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence “that all men are created equal” is a counter-factual: as an 
empirical matter, different people have different capabilities. 
Nevertheless, for the liberal constitutional state to function, we must act 
and treat other people as though we were equal.75 In other words, 
equality is a legal status, not a natural condition, and as such functions 
only insofar as we make an ethical commitment to it. 
Within the clan, man—and even more strikingly, woman—is 
neither free nor an individual. She is subordinate to her function within 
the group—in the case of woman, reproduction and the embodiment of 
honor.76 In the clan, there are no individual rights protected by law, only 
the honor of the family avenged by feud.77 A woman has no 
individualism because her body is the receptacle of the family’s lineage 
and honor.78 As Zug emphasizes, in traditional societies, women’s 
marital choices tend to be extremely restricted, which is why mail-order 
marriages can be seen as freedom-enhancing. 
Weiner’s analysis brings to mind Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist 
analysis of kinship systems set forth most succinctly in The Elementary 
Structures of Kinship. Lévi-Strauss emphasizes two important things: 
The first is that kinship systems structure how goods, ideas, and people 
are “exchanged” within a culture. The second is that kinship systems 
comprise “the exchange of women,” wherein family groups “give” 
women to another family to be a wife, and receive in exchange 
something of value (a dowry, for example). In other words, women are 
the proto-commodity.79 
Adopting the terminology of “[t]he founding father of legal history 
 
 74 Id. at 16. 
 75 As I have stated elsewhere: 
A[n] . . . empirical study resulted in the initially surprising suggestion that people 
who live in developed market economies are significantly more altruistic, generous 
and trusting than people who live in traditional cultures. Economist Samuel Bowles 
offers a possible explanation for this finding that is similar to my thesis: “Markets 
teach us to behave decently to strangers . . . . Markets are an arena in which you 
encounter somebody you’ve never seen before and engage in mutually beneficial 
activity.” 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Economic Rationality, Empathy, and Corporate Responsibility, 70 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 875, 883 (2002) [hereinafter Schroeder, Economic Rationality] (footnotes 
omitted). 
 76 WEINER, supra note 69, at 12. 
 77 Id. at 18, 101. 
 78 See id. at 113–14. 
 79 CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 478–82 (Rodney 
Needham ed., James Harle Bell & John Richard von Sturmer trans., 1969). 
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and legal anthropology, Henry Sumner Maine,” Weiner argues that 
individual rights only come into being with the development of the state 
when contract supersedes status—the relations that characterize the 
clan.80 Contract presumes formal equality and reciprocity that respects 
the independence of both parties. This is why contract is the dominant 
economic relation in liberal states founded on legal equality. I will 
return to this. 
In contrast, the dominant exchange relation in pre-modern clan 
societies is gift. Gift might at first blush seem benevolent—indeed 
reflecting a feminine ethic of care—in our society in which it is the 
exception to the norm of contract. However, in traditional societies gift 
is a way for one man to assert dominance over another. Gift is 
unilateral. In gift societies, not only must the donee accept the gift, he is 
required to reciprocate with an equivalent or greater gift or suffer shame 
and ostracism.81 Consequently, gift is a form of forced exchange and, 
therefore, aggressive. Perhaps the most extreme example of this 
dynamic was the practice of potlatch or gift as a form of war through 
which a great man would seek to impoverish his rival through ever-
increasing rounds of forced “generosity.”82 The anti-feminist aspect of 
gift-exchange clan societies becomes more apparent when one 
contemplates Lévi-Strauss’s point that the “gift” is often a woman.83 
The majority of Zug’s mail-order brides come from societies that 
are not fully modern in Maine’s contractual sense. Colonists in the 
seventeenth century and picture wives in the nineteenth were fleeing 
cultures still dominated by class and characterized by arranged 
marriages. Although arguably men in nineteenth-century America lived 
in a society dominated by contract, women’s rights to enter into 
contracts and own property were still limited. Consequently, because 
western jurisdictions granted women more economic equal rights, the 
decision to go from east to west was also a movement from status to 
contract. 
 
 80 WEINER, supra note 69, at 10. 
 81 MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC 
SOCIETIES 3 (W.D. Halls trans., 1990); see also JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF 
VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET 18–29, 63 (2004) [hereinafter SCHROEDER, VENUS]; 1 
GEORGES BATAILLE, THE ACCURSED SHARE: AN ESSAY ON GENERAL ECONOMY 70–71 (Robert 
Hurley trans., 1988). 
 82 CYRIL S. BELSHAW, TRADITIONAL EXCHANGE AND MODERN MARKETS 22–26 (1965); 
MAUSS, supra note 81, at 37. 
 83 Although this is beyond the scope of this Essay, psychoanalytic theory posits that, even 
today, “masculine” personality is created through the hypothetical possession and exchange of 
an object of desire, associated with the feminine, by a community of masculine subjects. 
“Feminine” personality, in contrast, reflects an identification with the object of desire being 
exchanged. This difference between having (masculine) and being (feminine) is reflected in the 
verb forms of European (and perhaps other) languages. See JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL 
AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE (1998) [hereinafter 
SCHROEDER, VESTAL] (explaining this dynamic); SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 81 (same). 
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Although the story is not simple with respect to contemporary 
mail-order marriages, the brides tend to live in either more “traditional” 
societies where women’s roles are constrained, or in countries that have 
only relatively recently rejected Communism but have not adopted a 
liberal political system. In these cases, the women perceive that they do 
not have the same marital and economic choices available in America. 
Consequently, it is not just that women achieve greater agency by 
being able to have a greater input into this process. The very fact that the 
commodification of women in marriage is made more express and more 
contract-like may itself be a step forward, as Zug suggests. Indeed, from 
a Hegelian perspective, it is not surprising that states and territories that 
encouraged mail-order marriage also granted women greater contract 
and property rights and even suffrage. That is, they recognized women 
as, if not quite equal subjects with men, nevertheless more subject-like. 
VIII.     FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT 
As suggested, the Zug-Weiner analysis is arguably more consistent 
with the speculative tradition of Continental theory generally, and 
Hegelian political philosophy specifically, than with classical liberalism. 
To reiterate, in classical liberalism the free individual is deemed natural 
so the state is seen as the problem to be explained. In speculative theory, 
the question is how to create individualism and freedom. As an 
empirical matter, we are born as helpless infants within families, learn a 
collective language, become subject to laws, etc., and nevertheless 
experience ourselves as being unique. Speculative theory seeks to 
understand these phenomena. Individuality is an artifice: a human 
creation and a hard-won achievement.84 The individual and the private 
law regime of rights are mutually constituting, each giving birth to the 
other.85 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right86 is, in the words of my colleague 
Arthur Jacobson, a Bildungsroman of personality.87 It follows the logical 
development of the person from the simplest conception through the 
empirical citizen located in the modern constitutional state in the order 
of right he calls Sittlicheit—usually translated into English as “ethical 
life.” I have discussed Hegel’s argument extensively elsewhere88 and will 
 
 84 BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 24 (1995). 
 85 ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 17 (1995). 
 86 G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood ed., HB. 
Nisbet trans., 1991) [hereinafter HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT]. 
 87 Arthur Jacobson, Hegel’s Legal Plenum, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 97, 115 (Drucilla 
Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld & David Gray Carlson eds., 1991). 
 88 I do this most thoroughly in SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 81 and SCHROEDER, 
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only make a few points before moving on to the aspect of the theory that 
I believe is relevant to Zug’s story. 
The first is that Hegel does not reject the classical liberal notion of 
the autonomous individual in the state of nature as a theoretical model, 
as opposed to a historic or empirical fact. Indeed, he begins his 
Philosophy of Right by accepting a radical version of liberalism, that 
espoused by Immanuel Kant.89 Hegel argues not that Kant is wrong, but 
that his theory is inadequate because it is logically incomplete as well as 
empirically inaccurate. The freedom that is the autonomous individual’s 
essence cannot be actualized in the state of nature because it is abstract 
and negative.90 
To put this more strongly, to call the free person in the state of 
nature is a misnomer. He, or more accurately, it, is free because it is 
radically abstract, having no concrete characteristics that could limit it. 
This means that each abstract person is indistinguishable from each 
other. Abstract right is the most “primitive” means by which the liberal 
person can take on individuating characteristics that will enable it (now, 
he or she) to be recognized as a unique individual.91 
For reasons that are beyond our present scope, Hegel believes that 
the abstract person can become concrete and freedom-positive only 
through relationships with others. The logically first and most 
“primitive” stage in this story is the creation of what I am calling the 
“subject”—the aspect of personality that is capable of bearing legal rights 
and duties—but which can also be thought of as an individual. This is 
achieved through what he calls “abstract right,” i.e., private property and 
contract. Specifically, the abstract person creates concrete individuality 
(i.e., differentiation and individuation) through a regime of possession, 
enjoyment, and alienation of objects of desire.92 
Hegel argues that contract is necessary for the creation of 
subjectivity, equality, and concrete freedom because it is bilateral. That 
is, although contract is limiting in that it binds the parties to obligations, 
it is not imposed by one party over the other, as it is in gift.93 Not only 
must each party bind herself (at least as a formal manner), she must 
respect the will of the counterparty to choose whether or not to bind 
himself. 
Second, it is crucial that the subject is not the historic first stage in 
the development of personality. Rather it was historically the last—the 
 
VESTAL, supra note 83. 
 89 SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 83, at 29. 
 90 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 86, at 46–49; BRUDNER, supra note 85, at 21, 
36; SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 83, at 32–33. 
 91 SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 83, at 33–34; Alan Brudner, The Unity of Property Law, 
4 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 3, 19 (1991). 
 92 His analysis is set forth in HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 86, at 73–103. 
 93 SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 81, at 53–54; see supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
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constitutional state in which the citizen is located could not come into 
being until the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century as its 
condition precedent. Or, more accurately, abstract right and the subject 
are born together. As we have discussed, historically, human societies 
have been characterized by status, not abstract right (contract). 
On the one hand, despite the fact that Hegel insists on the necessity 
of private property and contract, he is not a libertarian. The state and 
laws are necessary for the creation of positive freedom. Just as Kant’s 
notion of the autonomous individual in the state of nature proved to be 
a partial and inadequate account of personhood that had to be 
supplemented by the subject in abstract right, so will the subject and 
abstract right prove to be partial and inadequate. They will be 
supplemented by more complex and more adequate aspects of 
personhood created in the realms of morality and ethical life. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that Hegel insists that abstract 
right contains internal contradictions and must go under, neither is he a 
simplistic socialist. In contrast to Karl Marx who was deeply influenced 
by Hegel’s method and thought that capitalism was a necessary stage in 
the development of personality, Hegel argued that it was logically 
necessary for some regime of private property and contract to persist 
after the development of “higher” levels of societal development. 
Hegel’s (and Marx’s) logic is sometimes described by critics as an 
initial thesis, contradicted by its antithesis, resulting in a synthesis. In 
fact, he does not use this crude terminology which suggests that the 
contradictions within earlier stages in the logic will be eliminated or 
suppressed by later ones.94 Rather, he uses the terms understanding, 
dialectic, and speculative reasoning (the last often translated as the 
obscure English word borrowed from chemistry, “sublation”). 
An understanding is a statement of a proposition.95 The dialectic, 
as the etymology reveals, is a second reading that points out the internal 
contradictions that any positive statement inevitably leaves out.96 
Speculative reasoning proposes a third interpretation that shows how 
the understanding and the dialectic are simultaneously both false (in the 
sense of inadequate) yet contain a moment of truth.97 Any resolution 
produced by speculative reasoning is, however, merely temporary. The 
 
 94 Allen Wood states that, to his knowledge, this terminology is “never used by Hegel, not 
even once . . . . The use of [this] terminology to expound the Hegelian dialectic is nearly always 
an unwitting confession that the expositor has little or no firsthand knowledge of Hegel.” 
ALLEN W. WOOD, HEGEL’S ETHICAL THOUGHT 3–4 (1990). Michael Inwood suggests, however, 
that Hegel does endorse this terminology (which had been used by Fichte and Schelling) in his 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy. MICHAEL INWOOD, HEGEL 550 n.100 (1983). 
 95 DAVID GRAY CARLSON, A COMMENTARY TO HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 19–21 (2007). 
 96 Id. at 21. 
 97 JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE FOUR LACANIAN DISCOURSES OR TURNING LAW 
INSIDE-OUT 125 (2008). 
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speculative resolution proves to be a new understanding to be 
contradicted by a new dialectic, etc.98 In other words, although any 
specific contradiction is unstable and must go under, “contradiction” 
per se can never be eliminated. This means that Hegel’s system is 
dynamic because the only constant is change. 
Most importantly, the speculative conclusion simultaneously 
preserves both the understanding and its dialectic and their 
contradiction even as it negates them. This is because each lower step of 
the logic is seen as a building block of each higher stage and, therefore, 
must remain even after the higher stage is generated. To use a metaphor 
I have suggested before, the lower stages of the logic are like foundations 
of the higher stages which are like buildings.99 A foundation is only a 
hole in the ground until it becomes a part of the building built upon it. 
Its status as foundation is only retroactively imposed after the building 
“negates” its previous status as mere hole. Nevertheless, even after the 
building is built, the foundation must be preserved or the entire edifice 
“withdraws into its ground.”100 
In other words, Hegel disagrees both with the libertarian who 
believes the free market, contract, and property rights should not be 
restrained by the State and with the communist who would do away 
with private property and the market. Both ethical life and abstract right 
(as well as the intermediary realm of morality) are necessary for the 
actualization of freedom. 
Unfortunately, Hegel writes at such an abstract level that he does 
not give us advice as to how to balance the two. Indeed, Hegel thinks 
that philosophy is incapable of making such pragmatic decisions which 
he leaves to practical reason.101 This approach is necessary for his project 
of explaining the creation of freedom. If logic told us exactly what to do, 
we would not be free. 
What I want to emphasize here is first, Weiner’s point that the state 
is necessary for creation and preservation of positive liberal rights and 
freedom, because otherwise we would devolve back into the unfree 
 
 98 Id. at 125–26. 
 99 SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 83, at 312. 
 100 G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 437 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969). 
 101 This is one of the points of Hegel’s famous Preface to his Philosophy of Right. Although 
Hegel is known as an idealist, he is also a radical materialist in the sense that for an ideal to be 
potential, it must be actualized in the world—or more radically, we only know what is potential 
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But the infinitely varied circumstances which take shape within this externality as the 
essence manifests itself within it, this infinite material and its organization, are not 
the subject-matter of philosophy. To deal with them would be to interfere in 
things . . . with which philosophy has no concern, and it can save itself the trouble of 
giving good advice on the subject.  
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 86, at 21. 
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regime of the clan. Second, nevertheless, some degree of private 
property and markets must be retained. Although there can never be a 
perfect balance, there must be a, perhaps uncomfortable, coexistence 
between state and freedom. But third and most surprisingly for our 
purposes, the Hegelian approach would agree with critics of neo-
liberalism that market ideology results in commodification and 
alienation. However, it also accepts that these are paradoxically 
necessary for the actualization of freedom! 
IX.     THE DIALECTIC OF FREEDOM AND ALIENATION 
It is common for progressives to condemn capitalism—what 
Europeans tend to call neo-liberalism—for alienating people. 
Alienation, however, is a necessary moment in individuation. To Hegel 
(and, surprisingly, Adam Smith) that is abstract right’s great 
achievement. In earlier stages of development, people are ensconced in 
the hierarchal structures of the extended family and clan organized by 
status. Although perhaps people living in traditional societies were not 
as alienated as contemporary ones because they knew what their roles 
were, they were not free in that they had little or no choice in their lives. 
This was particularly the case for women who, as Zug’s book shows, 
were still largely defined by their status long after American men 
increasingly defined themselves through contract. 
Hegel’s position with respect to the historical role of contract has 
surprising affinities with Adam Smith’s. Smith was writing a generation 
earlier than Hegel, when Europe’s clan society (i.e., feudalism on the 
Continent, as well as clans in his native Scotland) was in the process of 
being supplanted by Enlightenment values, capitalist economics, and 
the concept of the liberal representative state. 
As Ronald Coase has explained, it is a misconception to think that 
Smith believed that people were naturally the rational, self-centered 
autonomous homo economicus that we encounter in first-wave law-and-
economics literature. As is the case with Hegel, the individual is the 
result, not the cause, of markets. When Smith thought about self-
interest, he conceived of concrete human beings located in family and 
society bound by ties of love. That is, self-interest includes caring for 
those one cares for. Coase’s point is that although in the simplistic 
popular misconception, Smith presents “man [as] an abstraction, an 
‘economic man,’ rationally pursuing his self-interest in a single-minded 
way[,] . . . . a rational utility maximiser.”102 In fact, Smith’s man also 
feels fellow feeling or sympathy and concern for others. In Smith’s 
 
 102 R.H. Coase, Adam Smith’s View of Man, 19 J.L. & ECON. 529, 545 (1976). I make a similar 
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words, even “[t]he greatest ruffian, the most selfish violator of the laws 
of society, is not altogether without it.”103 “How selfish soever man may 
be supposed . . . [he is interested] in the fortune of others and . . . their 
happiness [is] necessary to him though he receives nothing from it, 
except the pleasure of seeing it.”104 In other words, although we do 
things for others out of selfishness or self-love,105 it is not because we 
expect to receive some implicit quid pro quo, as the law-and-economics 
movement would have it. Rather, making others happy, makes us 
happy.106 
Smith’s concern is that such fellow feeling of benevolence has the 
limitations that Weiner associates with the clan. This is because the 
benevolence one feels for others as an empirical matter varies with 
proximity.107 After self-love, most people feel affection for their 
immediate family108 and a lesser sympathy with their extended family.109 
We often develop relations with friends and colleagues that are almost 
as intense as those we have with parents, siblings, and children.110 We 
tend to have fellow feelings towards those with whom we share some 
affinity, such as members of what Smith calls one’s order in society or 
nation,111 and I would add religion or ethnic group. As relationships 
become more attenuated, feelings for others can change “not simply [to] 
the absence of benevolence but malevolence.”112 As Weiner argues, in 
clan societies, groups establish solidarity through feuds.113 Because there 
is little conception of individual rights within clans, as opposed to the 
collective honor of the clan, disputes among members of rival clans 
cannot be peacefully resolved through a legal procedure involving the 
two parties. Rather, a perceived wrong suffered by one clan member is 
considered a harm suffered collectively by all that must be avenged by 
all against the entire clan of the wrongdoer.114 We see this dynamic in 
modern societies not only within gangs, but in lingering racial, ethnic, 
and xenophobic hostilities. 
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Consequently, the cooperation needed in a modern state and 
economy cannot be achieved through actual feelings of benevolence. To 
expect people to feel and act on a “benevolence as encompassing ‘the 
general happiness of mankind’ would require man to do something of 
which God is no doubt capable, but that is beyond the powers of 
man . . . .”115 Indeed, a government based on benevolence would be 
corrupt and undemocratic in that our leaders would naturally favor 
those they love over those they do not.116 
Specifically, Smith is contrasting early capitalism to feudalism in 
which familial and governmental organization were one and the same. 
Not only were the medieval European words for friend and relative the 
same, feudal obligations were expressed (and probably experienced) in 
terms of love.117 We should remember that the tropes of romantic love 
that Zug criticizes comes initially from the troubadours of courtly love 
who borrowed the language of the love of vassal and lord to describe 
that of lover and beloved.118 
It is this context that frames Smith’s famous assertion that “it is not 
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”119 
Market relations are valuable precisely because they break down the 
“natural” pull of the family and allow cooperation among persons who 
are not friends. If the butcher, et al. acted out of actual feelings of 
benevolence, he would favor his family, friends, and clan first. Such kin-
based relationships can only sustain the simplest economy. 
As Coase says, 
[l]ooked at in this way, Adam Smith’s argument for the use of the 
market for the organisation of economic activity is much stronger 
than it is usually thought to be. The market is not simply an 
ingenious mechanism, fueled by self-interest, for securing the co-
operation of individuals in the production of goods and services. In 
most circumstances it is the only way in which this could be 
done. . . . A politician, when motivated by benevolence, will tend to 
favour his family, his friends, members of his party, inhabitants of his 
region or country (and this whether or not he is democratically 
elected). Such benevolence will not necessarily redound to the 
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general good. . . . The great advantage of the market is that it is able 
to use the strength of self-interest to offset the weakness and 
partiality of benevolence, so that those who are unknown, 
unattractive, or unimportant, will have their wants served.120 
Shlomo Avineri sees a similar dynamic in the Philosophy of Right in 
the political realm. Note, this aspect of Hegel’s analysis is the mirror 
image of my earlier discussion. From the perspective of logic, abstract 
right is the most primitive method through which the liberal abstract 
person becomes individuated so that she can have the relationships with 
others that will make her freedom concrete. As an empirical matter, 
however, abstract right occurs late: it is the means by which the situated 
clan member separates herself from others in order to become an 
individual. In both accounts, however, individualism is the link between 
the abstract and concrete; between being autonomous and being 
dependent. In Hegel’s terminology, the individual is the sublation 
between the universal (Kant’s abstract person) and the particular (status 
within a specific clan). 
In Avineri’s reading, the family is characterized by “particular 
altruism” in which the actor acts “for the benefit of someone else with 
whom the actor is connected through ties which are called ‘family 
ties’. . . . Hence this altruism is limited and particular and does not apply 
to all and sundry.”121 This is Weiner’s rule of the clan. A state, in 
contrast, must be characterized by “universal altruism” in which one 
acts “out of solidarity, out of the will to live with other human beings in 
a community . . . . based on free consciousness, not on a biological 
determination.”122 
To get from the instinctual emotion of particular altruism to the 
conscious attitude of universal altruism, we require an intermediate 
condition. This is not, as one might suspect, “particular egotism.” This 
characterizes the Kantian individual in the state of nature—a logically 
simpler conception of personhood that does not exist empirically. 
Rather the ideal of political equality requires a moment of “universal 
egotism.”123 This is the regime of abstract right, i.e., civil society and the 
market economy. “This is the sphere where everyone acts according to 
what he perceives as his enlightened self-interest.”124 
Consequently, the state could not do away with the universal 
egotism of civil society or the particular altruism of the family without 
destroying itself. The state needs to preserve civil society and its regime 
of property, contract, and individual rights precisely because it breaks 
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down the “natural” ties of family (i.e., particular altruism) and creates 
the type of person who can serve as a citizen. Universal altruism, unlike 
particular altruism, is an ethical commitment, not an empirical emotion. 
Political equality requires that we not favor those we actually love—
government by love is feudalism. God demands that we love our 
neighbor. The state functions because it only demands that we act 
towards others as though we love them.125 
Consequently, Hegel, Smith, and Weiner’s point is not just that 
individualism and freedom are unnatural. It is that they must be 
purchased through a sacrifice of empirical solidarity. Hegelian logic 
however, insists that just as abstract right (property and contract) must 
be preserved in more developed human societies, so must the order of 
right that he calls morality, which includes the affectionate relationship 
of marriage. 
Zug suggests how mail-order marriage can be a liberating moment 
for women, at least during a transitional period from clan-status to 
liberal-contract. Although in the clan, relationships are characterized by 
actual empirical feelings of solidarity and affection to the extended 
family, marriage decisions had to be subordinated to the greater good of 
the clan. If this was difficult for men, it was harder for women whose 
duty was to reproduce in a way to further the interest of her family. The 
empirical emotions that the bride feels for the groom (and vice versa) 
were not the primary concern (although presumably, most parents 
hoped that their daughters not be miserable). 
In this context, mail-order marriage can help to establish 
individuality and feminine subjectivity by interfering with marriage as a 
status relationship. Is a woman a commodity in a mail-order marriage? 
Yes, but she was a commodity in traditional marriage. Hegel argues that 
the minimal condition of empirical freedom is subjectivity created 
through a regime of possession, enjoyment, and exchange of an object of 
desire. Ironically, in mail-order marriage, the woman might become 
more subjective by being the active participant in the arrangements of 
possessing, exchanging, and enjoying her own body as the object of 
desire that heretofore had been controlled by others. 
Those who decry the lack of individualized romantic element in 
mail-order marital decisions ignore—as Zug insists—that this element 
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was probably largely missing from the alternatives available for the 
women who accepted such offers. In clans, affection is vertical in the 
sense that what was important was the empirical love women felt for 
their parents and children because their duty is to continue the lineage. 
Marital affection might be a happy consequence of—not a reason for—a 
successful marriage. Consequently, to complain about the 
commodification of women in mail-order marriages is to ignore the 
material conditions of these women’s lives. Hegel opines that the 
conceptualization of marriage in terms of contract is “disgraceful.”126 
And so it is, if the parents and the groom are the effective parties to the 
contract. But from the position of the bride, the conceptualization of her 
role as a contract party is a step forward.127 
CONCLUSION 
Is Zug convincing in her defense of mail-order marriage? Yes, if 
one keeps in mind her modest goal. She is not trying to argue that it is, 
in its many permutations over the centuries, a wonderful institution. 
Rather, she recognizes that historically most women had limited 
autonomy. Feminine choice, particularly in connection with the choice 
of marriage partners and careers, has been constrained by law and 
custom. Nevertheless, women—and more recently gay men—should be 
judged as rational actors, not passive victims. In this context, mail-order 
marriages can be seen as a way to “increase . . . marital choice and form 
advantageous and empowering relationships.”128 That is, if women have 
been dealt with a bad hand, mail-order marriage has been one way they 
have played it to their advantage. She concludes, “[t]oday’s mail-order 
brides and grooms are not a throwback to an earlier, unenlightened 
time. Instead, like most of us, they are simply men and women who 
believe marriage will improve their lives, and we should support their 
choice.”129 
Zug easily demolishes the critics of mail-order marriages she does 
discuss, but leaves me wishing that she gave more time to discussing the 
negatives as well as the positives. I am also not entirely convinced that it 
is analytically useful to lump together so many different institutions. In 
particular, I question whether early colonist and settler recruitment 
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programs really have much in common with contemporary marriage-
brokerage websites. 
Nevertheless, this is a consistently interesting and thought-
provoking work. And, dare I say with respect to a scholarly book, it is a 
great read. 
